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Those in terested  in foreign policy are alm ost im m ediately informed 
by mass m edia about cases of violation of in ternational law, and can 
see th a t  the abnorm al situations brought abou t by law violations are 
m aintained for a  long tim e. To the  frequently raised stereotype questions 
(where are the sanctions of in ternational law, coercive measures of the  
U nited  N ations?) people do no t expect any reply, bu t receive the  news 
w ith acquiescence about th e  toll m aterial damages, protest, exchange 
of notes and abou t the  abortive session of the Security Council. The press 
reports about in ternational law, having been tram pled under foot, while 
newspaper readers th ink  th a t  a t  home, a t  the sam e tim e, the  thieves 
are caught, defrauders are punished, and there are countries where even 
adulterers are penalized.
So, does it  mean after all, th a t there  are no sanctions and constrain ts 
in international law ? According to  some definitions the answer is no. 
According to  the Hungarian Encyclopaedia o f Diplomacy and. Internatio­
nal Law  for instance, “ international law is a complex of all those rules 
which settle in ter-state  relations, brought abou t by the  s ta tes’ struggles 
and cooperation, on the basis of agreem ent . . . and whose observation is 
guaranteed by the  particular s ta te  — acting individually or collectively 
— with constraint.'’1. A  H ungarian  university textbook — now in use — 
puts it  in a more careful way: “international law does not lack completely 
the  possibility of enforcement of legal rules either, bu t the  means o f enfor­
cement differ significantly from those ensuring the im plem entation of 
dom estic law”. Then i t  is explained, th a t enforcem ent is applied in  a 
decentralized way “th a t is, the individual states by them selves or several 
sta tes together take common action in order to  enforce international 
legal rules. Self-support is, therefore, the kind of means, prim arily  resor­
ted to  in order to  im plem ent in ternational legal rules. This self-support 
can be a behaviour having disadvantegous effect on the s ta te  violating 
th e  law, which can take on different form s”, b u t — a p a rt from the  defense 
of the  attacked  party  — cannot mean the use of force or th rea ts  involved. 
In  addition — the textbook goes on — the possibility of “centrally app ­
lied constraints by the  com m unity of the s ta tes” is emerging in the fram e-
work of the U nited Nations. However, “the  im plem entation of the norms 
of in ternational law takes place w ithout the application of any sort of 
constraints, in the overwhelming m ajority  of cases” , in connection with 
which “the role of the world’s public opinion cannot be underestim ated 
e ither.”2
Kdroly Nagy is also of the  view th a t  sanctions and constraints play 
a decisive role in in ternational law. I t  is beyond doubt — he sta tes — 
th a t  the way of the  enforcem ent of in ternational law is not identical 
with th a t  of dom estic law, “the  difference between the  two, however, is 
no t in respect of the applicable m ethods, b u t ra ther in the proportions.”3 
In  dom estic law, in the overwhelming m ajority  of cases, sanctions are 
applied by the  power — enforcem ent organization which is of public power 
character and stands above the  subjects of law, bu t in  some cases the 
self-defense of the a ttacked  person, or w arding off a trespass on one’s 
own is also perm itted . In  international law the  proportion is reversed: in 
the overwhelming m ajority  of cases the offended s ta te  applies constraint 
through self-support against the  law-violator, in exceptional cases however, 
the application of enforcem ent having public power character, by the 
U nited N ations is justified , if  some s ta te  violated in ternational peace 
and security  with its aggressive action. According to  K âroly Nagy the 
legal enforcements in dom estic and in ternational law are sim ilar in the 
fact th a t  both  are applied by the sta te , therefore the enforcement is of 
s ta te  character.4
We could go on w ith quotations, b u t it has already become clear 
from the m entioned ones th a t  in ternational lawyers would give a more or 
less positive answer to  the  question raised in the title , while the opinions 
of the experts as well as newspaper readers will som ewhat differ from 
one another. In  a peculiar way, th is  can be explained by the fact th a t 
both the  former and the la tte r  do s ta r t ou t of dom estic law and take it 
as a  basis for comparison, b u t ju s t in  a  different way. In ternational law­
yers say th a t  law can be not law w ithout sanctions and enforcement, there­
fore these categories cannot be left ou t of international law either, while 
newspaper-readers expect in ternational law to contain the same sanc­
tions and constraints as the ones so frequently applied in domestic 
law.
W hat role is played by  sanctions and enforcement in domestic law ? 
We can cite either M arxist or non-M arxist authors, all of them  consider 
sanction and enforcement being of decisive im portance. “ We call law 
or legal normsystem  — writes M ihdly Szotdczky — the complex of be­
haviour rules enforced by s ta te  contraints expressing the will of the ruling 
class.”5 “The law is nothing else b u t a unique social technique” — says 
Hans Kelsen, then  continues: “This social technique means bringing 
about a behaviour through threaten ing  w ith constraints, which is con­
tra ry  to  the desired behaviour of people.”6 Kaimdin Kulcsdr is of the opi­
nion th a t  “through the  possibility of enforcement, the  sta te  power behind 
legal rules is a social reality  which cannot be ignored (th a t is, by indivi­
duals), and which is an  essential guarantee of validity. The possibility,
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however, — he adds — can ensure the valid ity  of the legal rule only 
form ally, if it is not followed by an actual im plem entation, th a t  is, by 
an effective social practice enforced by s ta te  organs as well. In  th e  case 
of the violation of law the  sanction . . . m ust im m ediately follow the 
violation of law in most of the cases, th is is the  only way in which real 
valid ity  can be guaranteed .”7
Are santion and constrain t identical notions in dom estic law ? Acc­
ording to  some views, yes, they  are. Others are of the  opinion th a t  legal 
sanction has the same content as legal consequence.
According to  th is view, every norm implies a sort of sanc­
tion  which can equally be positive or negative, th a t  is, a legal conse­
quence having the character of either advantage or d isadvantage.8 How­
ever, I  do not consider th is form ulation to  be an appropriate  one, tak ing  
into account the fact th a t  everyday language a ttr ib u tes  exclusively 
negative content to  sanction. The introduction of a “more exact” w ord­
ing is advisable only if the  expression of the everyday language would 
lead to  a m istaken theoretical conclusion. But th is is not such a case. 
Sanction, in my in terpreta tion , has by all means unfavourable conse­
quences for the person against whom it is applied. This can m ean the 
w ithdraw al of existing advantages, causing financial or o ther sort of 
disadvantage, a disapproval expressed by the au tho rity  concerned, penal 
measure, or even the  use of direct physical (armed) force. As far as the 
connection between sanction and constrain t is concerned, it sim ply means 
th a t  all of the above m entioned sanctions have compelling effects. N a tu ­
rally, not to  the same extent. While disapproval only affects the  behaviour 
of the person concerned, the  successful use of physical force deprives 
him  of the  possibility to  set ou t the behaviour a lternatives by himself. 
The objective is therefore, to  enforce a behaviour which is in harm ony 
with the  legal norms, and the  medium is the  application of a sanction or 
the prospect of using it.
Legal theory closely associates law and sanction w ith the notion of 
state. On the one hand, because historically, the  establishm ent of the  
sta te  m eant a t the same tim e the establishm ent of law, and on the  other, 
because “the will of the  ruling class, raised on the  level of legal force” 
is im plem ented by a public power, separated  w ithin the  organizational 
struc tu re  of sta te , which makes the classes of conflicting interests, 
as well as individuals living on the  territo ry  of the s ta te  and 
their organizations, im plem ent it. So there is no sta te  w ithout law and 
sanction, there is no law w ithout s ta te  and sanction and although the 
la tte r may have a num ber of variations, the existence of the system  of 
legal norms, in one form or another, is always a precondition of state 
sanction. Therefore, one is conditioned upon the  two others, and can 
function only if  i t  takes into account the o ther or the  th ird  one. I t  is 
the constrain t applied by the  s ta te  which distinguishes the legal norm 
from any other (moral, religious, etc.) norms. Every norm implies a 
sanction, b u t i t  is only the legal norm  whose im plem entation can be 
cuiaranted w ith sta te  enforcement.О
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W h a t we have discussed so far indicates th a t  dom estic law both 
in its emergence and im plem entation has the criteria of hierarchy. The 
emergence of dom estic law is the final phase of a  decision-m aking process 
in the course of which the  central s ta te  bodies give their decisions specific 
form and  in effect, they  disclose them  as orders to those concerned. 
Although i t  is true th a t a p a r t  of the  law brought abou t in this way also 
regulates the connection of the  central organizations with each other, 
bu t the hierarchical, sub- and super-ordinated relationships are de te r­
m inant from  the point of view of the whole legal system  of the state . 
Through dom estic law some regulate the  life of others, partly  disregarding 
w hether the  regulation will be approved or not. Decisions m ade in  the 
most dem ocratic way cannot be received with approval bv everv affected 
class, layer, group or individual. I t  has a great m any reasons. O ut of 
them  -  tak ing  in to  account the points of view of the discussed issue -  
we devote a tten tion  prim arily to  those clashes of in terests which exist 
betw een the ruling class and  the o ther classes. But those are also signi­
fican t which emerge between those groups of the ruling class which in 
fact exercise power and  those members of it who do not belong to  these 
groups. (The la tte r m ay not recognize their general class interests, or 
place th e ir specific group or individual in terest above the  essential class 
interests.) In  such circum stances the  efficiency of the legal system can 
only be ensured by centrally applied constraints. This, naturally , does 
not mean th a t th is is the only case for using constraints, in fact, in a 
politically stabilized society, enforcem ent of th is character can hardly 
be noticed: therefore the struggle against the violations of law having 
other social reasons, moves into the  centre of a tten tion .
From the point of view of our subject, the essential factor is th a t 
in dom estic law individuals can never regulate their own circum stan­
ces, th is is always done by some others, and some others make them  
im plem ent the legal rules as well. And here we have arrived a t the first 
point which does not allow com paring the functioning of certain in stitu ­
tions of international la w —including its system  of sanctions — with that 
of dom estic law.
Because in  in ternational law any sort of hierarchy is in effect 
excluded both in legislation and  im plem entation. In ternational relations 
are the contacts of sovereign states, those who are co-ordinates and are 
not subordinated or superior to  each other. The legal norms are elaborated 
by the sta tes themselves, either directly or through their organizations. 
None of the  states can be compelled by such a legal norm which would 
not have been approved by it previously in some form, and in principle, 
none of the states are obliged to  accept such norms which would be 
contrary  to its own in terests. Consequently -  and also in  principle - ,  
no such norms can be accepted which would serve onlv the  in terests of 
some individual sta tes and would contradict those of others. The 
norms o f in ternational law are n o t created by some to  regulate the 
circum stances of others, but by those concerned, to  regulate their own 
relations. I herefore, while in domestic law the decision-makers and those
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concerned by the decisions arc different, in international la w they are identical. 
This conclusion may not he too original, still we are inclined to  neglect it. 
Due to the formal sim ilarity  of dom estic and in ternational law, and  due 
to  the fact th a t both are of obligatory character, we tend  to  forget th a t  
the way of their establishm ent is different, although this m ay give rise 
to  essential differences in content. Because dom estic law cannot enjoy 
either in principle or in practice the approval of all those concerned, 
cannot expect them  to  com pletely and vo luntarily  observe law, while 
in ternational law can, in  principle.
In  practice, there  is not such a simple s itua tion  in in ternational 
law either, since a  p a rt of the norms does no t reflect identical interests. 
Because there are such norms whose elaboration was no t preceded by 
consensus. E ither because th ey  were accepted under ex ternal pressure, 
or because the consent served short term  tac tica l goals for any  o f the 
parties. In  the case of o ther norms there was a  consensus a t  the estab lish­
m ent of the norm , b u t later — due to social, economic or political 
changes in  the participating  sta tes — it ceased to  exist. This becomes 
clear especially following the v ictory of social revolutions, b u t m inor 
changes can also lead to  the  lack of consensus. A nd finally, there are 
some norms, in case of which agreem ent has been reached ,,in general” , 
b u t it  is „suspended” tem porarily  in the  given tim e and situation. 
Despite this, in in ternational law -  if we take the  complex of norm s -  
chances for voluntary , free-of-force im plem entation are much b e tte r  th an  
one would th ink  when reading the front-page news of papers abou t 
various conflicts.
I t  should also be borne in mind th a t in ternational law has some­
w hat different functions than  domestic law system s0. A lthough in general 
term s, both  serve to  ensure the general social living conditions o f the 
ruling classes, as well as —subordinated to  th is — the general social 
living conditions of the  individuals in the  sta te  concerned, but in concrete 
term s, one can discover certain  differences. The functions of dom estic 
law include the regulation of essential social relations, first of all, the 
regulation of the system  of property  prevailing in the given sta te . Domes­
tic law, therefore, contains measures on who, and under w hat conditions 
can acquire production means, in w hat ways properties can be alienated; 
it regulates the d istribu tion  of productions and the preconditions for 
the exchange of goods. In  th is way dom estic law secures conditions of 
m aintaining the prevailing way of production. In  addition, i t  secures 
the  power-political relations of the given sta te . I t  reflects, in some cases 
indirectly, in others directly, the quality  of the  class rule, th a t  is, which 
of the classes holds power, and regulates the  conditions of exercising 
power. Domestic law also regulates the  m ain characteristic features of 
the  political mechanism, the way of waging struggle for power, the 
struc tu re  of s ta te  organs and so on. Norms of such conten t cannot be 
found a t all in  in ternational law. There are no rules in  the  universal in te r­
national law th a t  would cover relations of property, d istribu tion  or ex­
change, or th a t  would regulate the way and conditions of exercising
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political power in the given country. The only th ing  it does is to protect 
the  social-economic-political system  of all the states, even w ithin th a t 
the  power of the group governing the country. T h a t means th a t  the 
universal system  of rules of international law leaves untouched the 
sphere of au th o rity  of dom estic law. So if  it is compared with domestic 
law, i t  cannot he called to  be a legal system  with class character. Conse­
quently, changes w ithin the sta tes occur independent of in ternational 
law in a certain respect, th a t is, they  do not bring about the violation 
o f prevailing norms (the consequences — as T have m entioned -  is another 
question, because they do).
The o ther difference between dom estic and in ternational law, in 
connection with the process of the establishm ent of norms, is also related 
w ith the  facts m entioned earlier. The possibility to modify or abolish 
norms is different. I f  the  social, economic and political relations of a 
given sta te  have changed, the  undesired norms can be amended, or a t 
the  very last, can be abolished. Moreover, if  a new class, or a  new group 
w ith different political trends gains power w ithin the form er ruling class, 
the  whole of the previous constitu tion can be set aside. No fundam ental 
changes are necessary to  modify dom estic norms. I f  those in power th ink 
th a t any of the norms did not meet previous expectations, functioned 
inadequately, or fu rther im provem ent of regulation became necessary, 
they  can bring the  appropriate  decisions. Although th is decision-making 
process is, in certain  cases — especially in those bourgeois dem ocratic 
sta tes where the  power relations are balanced between the parties —, 
very com plicated and in tricate , it is still much sim pler and faster than  in in­
ternational contacts. Maybe, the  new decision will no t be more progressive 
than  the previous one, therefore i t  would serve the interests of the groups in 
power even to  a  lesser ex ten t th an  the  preceding norm, the case a il/s till hare 
a solution, thus bringing about a neu-legality. The behaviour deemed yester­
day illegal, law-violating, would become by today  approved and lawful. 
Following as a m atter o f course, the new decision should not be approved 
or supported  by those who, as a result of the change of the regime, became 
relegated to  the background, as generally, the consent of classes, layers or 
groups having adverse interests should not be sought either. In  in te r­
national law, however, the agreem ent of all the parties concerned is 
needed for m odification or abolishm ent, which is very difficult to achieve, 
or impossible if  some continue to be interested in m aintaining the  vali­
d ity  of the prevailing norms. One of the principles of international law, 
the clausula rebus sic stantibus, provides a small possibility to  unilaterally  
abolish a norm in case of fundam ental changes in the circumstances pre­
vailing a t the tim e of the conclusion o f the  trea ty . This principle au tho ri­
zes the  s ta te  concerned to  annul unilaterally, bu t due to the  unilateral 
character, it does not solve the problem of m odifying or abolishing an 
international legal rule. Because if the contracting parties m aintain 
their view th a t  the circumstances, prevailing a t the tim e of the  tre a ty ’s 
conclusion have not changed, or not fundam entally  (generally they  will 
stick to th is view if they were unwilling to  approve the m odification or
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the abolishm ent), then  they  will deem annulm ent to  be as illegal as a 
violation of the trea ty  would be. To settle such legally disputable s itu a ­
tion  — as I  would deal w ith it  in detail —.th e re  is no effective in te r­
national forum , and cannot be set up either.
So the  current situation  is th a t while changes in in ternal social, 
economic and political relations can be followed by dom estic law w'ith 
more or less flexibility and readiness, thus being able to  legalize any 
kind of new situations, the system o f international legal norms proves to be 
rigid very often with the international consequences o f the same changes, 
and is unable to legalize them. Moreover, regardless of the fact w hether 
the changes concerned will forward on historical progress or on the d i­
rection o f reaction.
N aturally , all th is can influence our image concerning the applica­
b ility  of international legal sanctions. Because if a p a rt of the law' viola­
tions is brought about by the fact th a t the consensus, prevailing a t the 
tim e of the  tre a ty ’s conclusion ceased to exist as a result of internal 
changes in some of the  states, the  question may be raised: is i t  practical 
or even possible to  apply any sort of legal sanction in such a case ? And 
th is question is sharply raised if  the changes are interrelated with pro­
gressive social processes. One would be wrong to  expect in ternational law 
to  use sanctions in the  violation of norm s rendered ou tdated  by his­
tory .
How can we then judge the o ther violations of norms ? Those, which 
cannot be a ttr ib u ted  to  social economic and political changes, or when 
the rigid character of international law' cannot be blam ed either. Or those, 
when the observation of the given norm (e. g. the  ban on the use of force, 
or on intervention) is in the in terest of the international com m unity. Is 
not there a  basis of sanctioning such norms ?
In  principle perhaps, there is, b u t the “main problem ” of in te rnatio ­
nal law' is said to be the absence of a “central power-enforcement organi­
zation” which would be able to  “enforce” a behaviour in  harm ony with 
the law'. In  fact, th is would be the m ain problem of in ternational law 
only in th a t case if the establishm ent of any kind of central pow'er-enfor- 
cement organization would be possible. According to historical experi­
ences, there has never been such a possibility. Because the  central pow'er- 
enforcem ent organization, in the form in which it is existing w ith in  the 
sta te , cannot be established w ithin the  order of international relations -  
if we disregard the sporadic a ttem p ts aim ed a t  realizing the imperial 
idea. Any kind of international arm ed forces can have only a “coalition ’ 
basis, th a t  is, when states having identical foreign political objectives 
coordinate their m ilitary endeavours, and establish a jo in t com m and for 
some of their national arm y units. Even in this case the  in tegration of 
arm ed forces means only the intertw ining of comm anding bodies; the  
arm y units continue to be of a  national character. Such coalition forms 
have been existing to  the present, too, b u t they  always serve the achiev- 
ment of certain foreign political aims, against certain  external enemy. 
They have never represented, and do not represent supra-national po-
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wer; th e ir strength  have become effective only in context with the 
real or supposed external enemy, in a relative way.
And th is is the very essence: the  establishm ent of a centralized power 
enforcem ent organization would be conditioned upon the ylohaf centra­
lization o f power as well; because every power-enforcement organization 
would be ineffective w ithout having actual power. The global centrali­
zation of power, on the  o ther hand, can only be envisaged with the estab ­
lishm ent of a world-state. So we have arrived a t  the triv ial tru th : onlv 
the  establishm ent of a w orld-state would m ake the  general enforcement 
o f international legal norms possible. B u t there  is not much sense in 
contem plating abou t it.
In  those days, no efforts were made to  bring about a sort of cen trali­
zed power w ith in  the fram ework of the U nited  Nations, except for the 
conditions for setting  up UN arm ed forces were established.10 But by 
granting the right of veto to the big powers in the Security Council, the 
possibility to  use the UN arm ed forces against e ither of the  big powers 
(or its allies) as possible aggressors, was excluded from the very outset. 
This “coalition” solution could not be used either, since the big powers 
w ay back in 1045 had  no identical foreign political objectives, which is 
one of the  basic preconditions for the coalition’s efficiency. (Consent could 
possibly have been reached only against the revival o f revanchism .) As 
a  result, independent of the cold w ar period, the  U N  arm ed forces could 
no t have been set up a t all. As is well-known, those resolutions which 
were brought by the U N  Security Council on Rhodesia, or the Republic 
of South Africa, did not contain measures on arm ed enforcement. The 
“ UN action” in Korea proves the above m entioned argum ent: taking 
advantage of the absence of the Soviet representative, the western 
powers formed quickly coalition and brought a resolution in the Security 
Council, thus enabling American and other arm ed un its to  illegally tigh t 
under the colours of the world organization against the K orean People’s 
Dem ocratic Republic and the  Chinese People’s Republic. As far as the 
so-called peace-keeping forces of the  U nited  N ations are concerned, they  
— as is also well-known — have never intervened against the sta te  con­
sidered to be the aggressor, bu t tried to  prevent different arm ed conflicts, 
even in th e  physical sense o f the  word.
I f  the centralized power-enforcement organization cannot be ex­
pected to  apply  enforcement, what then sanctions mean in international 
law ?
I  have already quoted in the introduction the  argum ent o fthe  curren t­
ly used textbook, according to  which, enforcem ent is applied in a  de­
centralized way in international law, th a t is, the sta tes individually or 
through jo in t actions together with others enforce international legal 
rules. Self-support is, therefore, the  means which can be employed in 
order to achieve the  enforcem ent o f th e  international legal rules. I t  can 
take two forms: retaliation and  reprisal. Both are steps taken  bv the 
offended party  which can cause disadvantage in one way or another for 
the offending party . But while retaliation in itself would not m ean viola-
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ting  the  law (e. g. canceling diplom atic relation), the  reprisal — if  i t  is 
not applied as a sanction — would (e. g. unilateral annulling of a trea ty ). 
The precondition for applying reprisal is to  m ain tain  the proportions: 
the sanction cannot cause more severe d isadvantage th an  the  original 
violation of law itself. Furtherm ore, no arm ed forces can be used in 
reprisal, only if  the law violation itself was an  ac t of force. Generally, 
these sanctions can be applied only by the offended party ; jo in t action 
can take place only in  order to  prevent arm ed aggression.
The use of both reta lia tion  and reprisal is allowed by in ternational 
customary law. There has never been a w ritten  law concerning the  nature 
o f response to  be employed by the offended p a rty  (retaliation  or reprisal), 
and the character of offence to  which it is a response, w hether the  reac­
tion to  an offence should be an offence of identical quality , w hat the res­
ponse can em brace, w hat proportionality  means more exactly, etc. 
Therefore, the system  of sanctions of in ternational law cannot be com ­
pared to  th a t of dom estic law in th is respect either, since the la tte r  is 
regulated by very precise rules in most o f the  cases. The dom estic law 
exactly determ ines the natu re  of procedures in the  course of which sanc­
tions can be applied, and the sphere of rights, the  d isputing parties have, 
when they  try  to enforce their own interests. W ritten  in ternational law 
does not contain details about these questions either. As a  result, th e  
sanction system  of international law is based on a  much more insecure 
foundation, although there are some other reasons, too.
The o ther m ain reason for uncertain ty  is the fact th a t  the violation 
of law itself — whether it  took place or not — and its judgem ent, cannot 
be legally clarified in  a satisfactory m anner. Because if  one sta te  has 
violated the  law in its dealings w ith  another s ta te  —w ith whom it has legal 
relationship — there are two possibilities. The offending p a rty  either 
admits the  fact of violating the law and undertakes to  face all th e  conse­
quences (it is ready to  pay compensation, give satisfaction for it, etc), or 
does not admit, claiming th a t  the offence did no t take  place, or if  i t  did, 
the offending party  rejects to  undertake responsibility for it. I t  is evident 
th a t  the  firs t case does not cause any problem. A lthough the  violation 
of the  law will be redressed outside the  law, i t  will be based on an in te r­
national legal rule prevailing between the two states involved. Therefore, 
the parties would not have a real conflict, and as a result, the  problem  
of applying sanctions would not even be raised. The second case, howe­
ver, is more complicated. I f  the alleged offending p a rty  is unwilling to  
m eet the dem ands of the offended sta te , the la tte r cannot tu rn  to  anyone 
to seek justice. T h a t would be the  case when the question of applying 
sanctions would occur.
Legal institu tions have been existing for a  long tim e in  domestic- 
law, which m ay help to  bring an action against the offending p a rty  of the  
law-. Generally, in civil cases the offended party , while in crim inal cases 
the prosecuting a ttorney  in itiates the procedure, in the  course of which 
the court brings a dear-cut decision whether the violation of the  law did 
in fact take place, if the alleged person was the offender, and  w hether
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he would answer for his deed. The judicial process can be regarded as 
being a legal consequence, and  natu rally , further court decisions will 
be made w ithin the sphere of law. In  universal in ternational law, however, 
there  has never been a compulsorily valid jurisdiction. So w hat is happen­
ing there?  Nothing else bu t the  sta tes concerned have to  s ta rt settling 
th e ir conflicts outside legal jurisdiction. The easiest way is to conduct 
diplom atic negotiations if the  offending s ta te  is willing a t all to enter 
into talks w ith the offended party . I t  is possible th a t  such discussions 
could “lead to resu lts”, th a t  is, a  compromise is achieved. However, the 
natu re  of the compromise excludes the complete fulfilm ent of the  m axi­
mum of the justified  dem ands subm itted  by the  offended state; so its 
content will be independent to  a great ex ten t of the de facto legal s itu a ­
tion. A compromise is then reached tak ing  in to  account a num ber of 
o ther factors, including the  s ta te  of power relations, the subjective readi­
ness of the parties to  come to an agreem ent, and several others, all of 
which could play a role. I t  will have som ething to  do with international 
law only from the poin t of view th a t the parties in dispute will try  a t 
the negotiations to in terp re t — naturally  in their own way — the norms 
of international law. And if  the discussions do not end with concrete 
results, and the dem ands o f the offended p a rty  are not met, then  the 
consequences of the violation of the  law are determ ined by the offended 
p a rty  itself: w hether i t  decides to  apply sanctions against the offending 
party  or not. This will also have nothing to  do w ith international law, 
being the offended party  the judge of its own case. No one can guarantee 
th a t  it did, in fact have the righ t to  apply the  given sanction or not.
As far as the In ternational Court of Justice  is concerned, a d isputed 
case can be subm itted  there only if  the parties concerned, agreed to do 
so. In  fact, th is is also a  kind of compromise. B ut since the offended party  
can legally achieve the fulfilm ent of the  m axim um  of its dem ands, or 
lose the case (sometimes it  sim ply depends on the  composition of the 
Court), such an agreem ent is very rarely reached and even then in minor 
cases only. The verdicts brought by the  Court are compulsory; they  can 
set out the measures to  be taken in order to  restore the lawful conditions, 
bu t cannot order any  sanction.11
On the basis of all this, we can s ta te  th a t in the current system  of 
international law sanctions can be only a de facto consequence of the 
offence against the law, bu t cannot be a de jure  consequence. Even des­
pite  the fact th a t  the  offended party  judged the  violation of law, and the 
responsibility ot the  offending party  in an appropriate  way, and applied 
sanctions in a proportionate m anner.
Kelsen is also of the view th a t the above factors are the m ain ones 
causing uncertain ty  w ithin the  sanction system  of international law. 
In  one of his works he explains th a t  the internal legal system  never 
associates punishm ent to  theft as a fact in itself; only a laym an can in ­
terp ret the legal nature  of penalty in such a way. We express only our 
personal opinion -  lie goes on sta ting  -  when we say th a t  X. has com- 
m itted  a theft. In  the realm of law it is the objective opinion, which is
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of decisive im portance, the  one expressed by a  s ta te  body set up for th is 
purpose. From  the legal point of view any o ther opinion — about the 
existence of the  fact determ ined by the legal system  — is o f no interest. 
Penalty  is linked by the  legal system  exclusively with the  facts revealed 
in  the  course of the procedure ordained by the  au thorities concerned. 
In  K elsen’s view, th is is the  very reason why the  establishm ent of courts 
was perhaps the  m ost significant move, for it m eant the setting  up of a 
body separated  from the  parties concerned, which in principle, is able 
to evaluate facts in an unbiased way. This replaced the in stitu tion  of 
self-support and self-judgement in dom estic law. In  the decentralized 
legal system , however, uncertain ty  remains: if  one of the s ta tes  applied 
a  sanction against the other, it  is not sure whether, according to  the  
legal system , the  given s ta te  applied a sanction or an offence against 
law, w hether i t  im plem ented or violated the prevailing legal sys­
tem .12
On the  basis of the  above statem ents, we should have doubts con­
cerning the  legal character of sanctions applied in in ternational relations. 
Kelsen, however, himself comes to  a different conslusion. He writes th a t 
in a decentralized legal system , general norms are applied in  a particular 
case w ithout including individual norms. (In his term inology individual 
norm is the ordaining of the use of sanctions by a court.) According to 
this, individual norms can be found in dom estic law, while then  cannot 
be found in in ternational law, b u t independent of th is, the  sanction sys­
tem  of the  la tte r  can still be a legal system  of sanctions.13 B ut, in my 
view, there  is nothing to  justify  K elsen’s jov iality  to  the  decentralized 
legal system . His s ta tem en t quoted above can refer only to  a prim itively  
developed norm  system  based on self-support. The latter, however, had 
exceeded th is stage w ith the  emergence of courts separated  from  the  
involved parties, while in ternational law has no such perspectives.
Herz is also arguing w ith Kelsen over th is question.14 H e explains 
th a t  reprisal is no t in fact an in stitu tion  of international law. I f  sta tes 
respond to  detrim ental behaviour conducted against them , w ith a sim i­
lar detrim ental behaviour, th en  the  essential factor is no t w hether any 
of the  s ta tes  violated the  law, b u t if  the  action concerned was detrim en­
ta l a t all. W hen carrying out the  responsive action, the  sta tes concerned 
are often not aware o f the  fact th a t  they  are just applying a legal sanc­
tion. T heir behaviour can be considered as a counter-action, only in a 
broader sense of the  term , in the course of which th ey  m ay refer to  law, 
bu t one cannot decide w hether they  do it in good or bad faith.
Herz points ou t th a t  in  the in ternational scene in m ost of the dis­
pu ted  issues currently on the agenda, there is in  principle, one or another 
kind of legal regulation. B u t in order to have the  concrete disputes s e tt­
led, on the  basis of international legal rules, the  parties concerned should 
reach agreem ent to  th is effect. So a special compromis diplomatique 
is needed which would express their readiness to  apply the earlier ela­
borated rules in reality, and spare no efforts to  settle the  concrete dis­
pute  between them  on the  basis of those rules. This means, th a t  in effect,
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an additional stage will be interposed between legislation and im plem en­
ta tio n  of the  law.
According to  Herz the  prevailing in ternational law obliges the par­
ties concerned to  do two things: to  im plem ent th e  given international 
legal rule, and to  peacefully settle  all the  disputes in  connection with 
the  im plem entation. The current general system  of in ternational law 
does not contain any fu rther guidance th a t  which of the  means should 
bring abou t a solution to  the  disputes. The parties concerned are not 
obliged to  subm it th e ir  d ispute to  any U N  body or court, to conduct 
diplom atic talks or to have discussions through m ediation. Therefore, 
in one of the  sta tes is unwilling to  enter into talks w ith the  other, or ex­
presses special protest against m ediation in general, or against the  m edia­
to r in particular, nothing can be done, the  case rem ains unsettled. Herz 
adds th a t  even the  acceptance of in ternational law as a basis for their 
dispute or conducting legal discussion by the  parties concerned, cannot 
be guaranteed  or obliged in general.
Taking all this into account, if th e  offended s ta te  (or the one regard­
ing itself to  have been offended) applies reprisal, its action — according 
to  Herz’s view — cannot be considered as a legal sanction, only if  the 
parties achieved the m entioned compromis diplomatique, and their 
conflict is settled on the  basis of th a t. In  all the  o ther cases, “reprisal” 
is a social reaction, in the general sense of th e  term . Because no one has 
authorized the “offended s ta te ” to apply reprisal, no one can be sure if 
it is fully justified. Herz notes th a t  the  case of custom ary international 
law is even more com plicated because the content of the legal rule is 
uncertain  as well, which makes its im plem entation even more difficult. 
( ustom ary law leaves even less room for se ttling  disputes w ith lawful means.
On m y part, I  com pletely agree with the point of Herz. I  do not 
cpi esti on th a t  th is social reaction is a sanction in the m ost general sense 
o f the word, b u t I also doub t if  i t  means legal sanction in each of the 
cases. One of the  cases, where this is especially clear-cut, is self-defense. 
The m ost essential rule of in ternational law allows the sta te  attacked  
by an  ex ternal force to  resort to all the  possible means a t its disposal 
to  defend itself. The Charter o f the U nited  Nations considers th is right 
to be “the  inherent r ig h t” of the s ta te  th a t  has become the victim  of an 
arm ed a ttack . I t  is, in fact an  “inherent r ig h t” — since, the s ta te  con­
cerned will hardly ask in ternational lawyers to  decide whether it is allo­
wed to  defend itself or not. I f  it is able to, it will concentrate all of its 
forces to avert the a ttack  and to  m aintain its own existence. Is it then 
a sanction, applied in the case of self-defense ? In  dom estic (criminal) 
law, it  is not. The use of self-defense will ensure only exem ption for the 
attacked  person from th e  criminal responsibility. Because criminal law 
is consistent in applying the principle th a t sanctions can be used only 
by the sta te ; it does not deem counteractions of individuals to be san­
ctions. In  international law, however, the situation  would be completely 
different, tak ing  in to  account the fact tha t simple defense can hardly be 
separated  from reprisal, as far as th e ir  content is concerned. “Reprisal
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or punitive  reta lia tion  means a more severe disadvantage th an  retorsion, 
i t  is such a coercive m easure which would mean in  itse lf a violation of 
law if  being applied not in reta lia tion  for offending against law, th a t  is, 
w ith the  purpose of sanction” — writes the  tex tbook  of in ternational 
law .15 Is the  arm ed defense a coercive measure ? Yes, it is. W ould i t  m ean 
a  violation of the law in itself? Certainly, i t  would. And where are its 
lim its?  U ntil it  is proportionate to  the  violation of law — is the  answer, 
given by the  textbook. However, proportionality  is difficult to  be laid 
down exactly. For instance, the  question occurs w hether defense can 
be continued beyond the  national frontiers. Is it  possible to  occupy 
the enem y’s territo ry  during the war, to destroy its arm am ent and sta te  
system ? I t  is certain th a t beyond a given point it is much more th an  
sim ply “defending the  national frontiers” , it means causing severe d a ­
mages to  the  enemy thus preventing the danger o f ano ther aggression. 
Are these measures w ithin or beyond the borders, legal consequences? 
Une could hardly say, ves. Since there  is not a  body specifically devoted 
to  find out i f a n  aggression was in fact com m itted, and if  yes, then  by 
whom. There are a  num ber o f well-known arm ed conflicts in th e  course 
of which the series of actions and reactions constitu ted  such a spon tane­
ous process which had not m uch to  do with the  law.
Self-support, as a  general sanction can be applied against the  sta te  
no t m eeting its  com m itm ents, regardless of th e  fact w hether it  is consi­
dered to  be of legal character or not. There is no trace in it of the  common 
action by the  in ternational com m unity. Kelsen, however, holds a diffe­
ren t view. He says th a t  individual self-support a part o f the  com m unity’s 
ac tiv ity  to  enforce law. “The coercive measure applied in  response to  
the  delict can be in terpreted  as a reaction of the  in ternational legal com­
m unity” — he sta tes .16 In ternational realities, however, do not back up  
th is sta tem ent. Because opinions m ay considerably differ in  the  in te r­
national “legal com m unity” depending on which of the sta tes has com m it­
ted  the  violation of the  law. The extremely differentiated com m unity of 
the  sta tes very rarely evaluates a  concrete behaviour as being an  offence 
against law directed a t  the  whole comm unity, and  do not unanim ously 
approve of the individually  applied sanctions. (The very few excep­
tions include the general condem nation of the  racialist policy pursued 
by the Republic of South Africa and Rhodesia.)
The o ther factor of uncertain ty  w ithin the sanction system  of in te r­
national law is linked with th e  probability of the  application of self- 
support. Weber says th a t  one of the im portan t characteristic features 
of the  (internal)  legal system  is the  fact th a t its existence “is externally 
guaranteed by the ;probability, th a t  the body specifically set up  by the 
people with such purpose, will apply physical or psychological constraint 
to  enforce the observation o f order, to  retaliate disobedience”.17 A nd not 
a  weak probability: “Clearly — he writes w hithin another context — in 
individual cases the most varied factors may contribu te to  ensuring the 
im plem entation of an  order, but we can speak about guaranteed law only 
if  it is probable th a t in the  given case constraints, legal constrain ts will
DOES INTERNATIONAL LAW CONTAIN SANCTIONS ? 267
emerge for the sake of enforcem ent” . So in such cases “the group of 
people, set up for th is purpose, will act even if  only the  norms were violated, 
th a t  is, for mere formal reason, too” .18 Well, i t  hardly should be proved 
th a t  in  international law one does not find the  motive of acting for the 
constra in t itself, against the violation of law, and there is no probability 
for applying constraints either. In  order to  achieve th a t  we could speak 
abou t probability  in in ternational law, it  would be necessary th a t  all 
the  sta tes whose rights were violated, have the  same possibility to  apply 
constrain ts and are sim ilarly interested in  it. In  international contacts 
however, mostly those sta tes resort to  self-support who should not fear 
a more severe counter-action and  who may expect enforcement to restore 
the legal s ta te  of affairs in effect. I t  is evident th a t the extrem ely diffe­
ren tiated  composition o f the  international com m unity as well as the 
different nature of certain  bilateral power relations do no t always make this 
possible. There are some sta tes who can afford applying constraint against 
ones but no t against others, and the o ther way round, there are states 
on whose p a rt constraints can be expected as a response to  the law viola­
tion, and there are others who are not likely to  react to  it with enforce­
m ent. The balanced power relations of the leading powers of our age 
exclude the possibility of such a  s itua tion  in which any of the states 
could continously neglect its in ternational legal com m itm ents, with 
regard to  anyone else.
N aturally , all th is is tru e  in connection with the interests. The sta te  
whose rights have been violated  m ay not always be interested in applying 
its righ t of self-support against the offending sta te . I t  ra ther refrains 
from th a t, being well aware of the  fact th a t  worsening their bilateral 
contacts could lead to  more detrim ental consequences th an  the re ta lia­
tion of a m inor violation of law. This factor can also reduce the probabi­
lity  of applying constrain t and considerably contributes to  the uncertain 
character o f in ternational legal sanctions.
Those who a ttr ib u te  significance to  sanctions and constraints in 
the im plem entation of in ternational law, I  th ink  are wrong when they  
confuse the  mere theoretical possibility with the social probability. N a­
turally , it is justified to  point out th a t  every offended s ta te  has the righ t 
to  use self-support, even the  means can be enum erated which can be 
resorted to, rules can be analysed in detail which deal with the possible 
application of arm ed constraints carried ou t w ithin the framework of 
the world organization, and a num ber of theories on sanctions can be 
based upon these, bu t the  real question is in effect decided by the fact 
whether or not in the case of law violation there is a de facto probability  
of applying legally regulated sanction. All th a t have been explained so 
far, as well as the  em pirical experiences lead to the conclusion th a t there 
is no such probability . And when one of the sta tes applied sanction against 
the  behaviour of the other, even then one does not know for sure if  it  
did have the right to  do so, since it  is very difficult to  find out reliably — 
and m ost im portan t of all, “law fully” — whether the  law was in fact 
violated, and by whom.
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The sanction applied against unlawful behaviour — especially 
when used as retaliation — can be, from the sociological point of view, 
hardly differentiated from the  reaction which is the  consequence o f not 
an unlawful b u t only a  detrim ental a ttitude . Since the  offended sta te  
applies the sanction not prim arily  because the action is unlawful, bu t 
because it is detrim ental. I t  would like to overcome, in one way or ano t­
her, the  damages caused by the  disadvategous effects of the  action, or 
would like to  prevent its p artner from causing disadvantages in the  future. 
This is also true when the offended sta te  did not suffer any grievance, 
still it  applies counter-m easures, because the  behaviour of the  o ther 
s ta te  had a  serious influence on its own interests. I f  the  counter-m easures 
take the form of not unlawful b u t a detrim ental behaviour, th is also 
means reta lia tion  and the counter-m easures will have the  same conse­
quences as the ones in the previous case. N either of the  types of reactions 
is regulated by in ternational law, no details can be found as to  w hat sort 
of counter-m easures can be taken. Practically, the  process is going on 
outside the sphere o f the law in both cases.
So there are significant differences to  be discovered between the 
sanction system s of the  in ternational law and dom estic law. I t  is w orth­
while com paring these with W eber’s notions. Weber also s ta rts  ou t of 
the  differences appearing in the  sanction system  when he differentiates 
between the  conventional order and legal order. In  his view, social ac ti­
v ity , social relations can be based by the partic ipan ts always on an 
image concerning the  existence o f a legal order. We can speak about 
order when the  participan ts base their activities upon suppliable “m axi­
m a”, whose acceptance is contributed to  by the fact th a t  they are consi­
dered to  be v a lid — obligatory or a pattern  to  be followed — concerning 
the ac tiv ity . The order can be conventional “if  its valid ity  is externally  
ensured by the  probability, th a t  the one who violates it should have to 
face a general and practically manifested disapproval of a certain group 
of people”. We speak about legal order “if it is externally  guaranteed by 
the probability  th a t  a special body of people set up for th is purpose 
will apply physical or psychological constraint to  enforce the observation 
of order, to reta lia te  disobediance” .19 “The two kinds of order — adds 
W eber — differ from one another exclusively from the  point of view of 
the  sociological struc tu re  of constraint, since in the  case of convention, 
there are no people who would be ready to p u t an enforcing constrain t 
in to  operation .”20 He points ou t in another p a rt th a t  he deems in te rnatio ­
nal law to be a conventional order. But, in m y view, the  definition of 
th is cannot be applied completely to  international law. As I  have noted 
in o ther contexts, in in ternational life, the violator of “convention” 
meets very rarely w ith a “general and practically  m anifested disap­
proval” . D isapproval is restricted  to a much narrow er circle, th a t  is, 
generally to  the offended party , and — in the  case of a more serious 
offence — to i t s  friendly sta tes and allies. B ut th is  is not too much, es­
pecially, if  the negative evaluation of a group of sta tes is confronted 
w ith an active approval on the p a rt of another group of countries. Di-
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sapproval has a greater role ra th e r in sm aller hum an comm unities (ori­
ginally W eber also m entioned such communities). Individuals are less 
able to  cope with the objection of th e ir surrounding com m unity for 
a  long period of tim e, while a s ta te  can neglect — often w ithout any 
fu rther consequences — the  clearly expressed disapproval of the o ther 
states.
As far as I  am  concerned, I  would not s ta r t  ou t from the facts of 
approval or disapproval, bu t from  the  interest which contributes to  the 
establishm ent of in ternational legal norm s by the  sta te . One should not 
go too far to  find these in terests which are m anifested quite clearly. A 
library  could be filled up  by the books devoted to the analysis of the in ­
creasing in ternationalization  of production, the  deepening of the m utual 
interdependence of states, the  emergence of the  balance of power brought 
about by the  revolutionary changes in m ilitary technology, th a t  is, all 
those factors which increased the  in terests of the sta tes in coordinating 
their activ ity , m aintaining international security, and preventing con­
flicts th a t  have the im m inent danger o f leading to  arm ed clashes. No 
new discoveries are required to  ensure these interests. The m ethod is 
well-known: to establish such a system o f behaviour norms, which are 
universal, regional or particu lar, depending on the nature of the  interests, 
which constitu te a firm  basis to  be relied on, to  provide foundation for 
cooperation and increase the  possibility to  forecast the  prognosis of the 
a ttitu d es  of the parties concerned in international relations. In terests, 
appearing almost in an identical way and to  the  sam e ex ten t for all the 
sta tes, can bring abou t cooperation and consensus needed in order to 
lay down the norms and concrete ways and means o f cooperation. These 
objective interests linked with cooperation guarantee the  respect of 
norms of international cooperation in such a com m unity which is de­
centralized from the political and power points of view, and which is 
unable to  set up a  central power-enforcement organization.21 Compared 
to this, in ternational legal order should not be called as a  system  of 
constrain ts, we should not endeavour to prove the  existence of a  sanction 
system  in this sphere too, sim ilar to  th a t  of dom estic law, even by neglect­
ing realities, f t  is enough if we regard sanctions — in a broader sense of 
the term  — in the reduction or lack o f readiness to cooperate. Because 
when one of the sta tes applies reta lia tion  or reprisal against another, 
offending the norms, the stress is not on causing disadvantage in itself, 
b u t on the  fact th a t  the o ther s ta te  suffering the grievance would be 
unwilling to  continue cooperation upset by  the  law violation, according 
to  the  previous practice. Moreover, if  the law violation was a more signi­
fican t one, the  s ta te  concerned m ay decide to  reduce or even discontinue 
cooperation not only in the  sphere concerned, b u t in all spheres of bila­
teral contacts.
So, using W eber’s terminology, conventional international order is the 
one whose validity is guaranteed by the probability that its violator can except 
the absence of readiness to cooperate, or a reduction of cooperation on the part 
of the offended state, or states.
270 T,. VALUT
N aturally , it can happen th a t  the s ta te  offending the conventional 
order has to  face physical constrain t, applied if  not by a separate  body, 
bu t by the offended sta te . W eber does not exclude th is possibility in his 
above quoted explanations either: “Revolt against every convention 
m ay lead to  a punishm ent o f enforcement by the  surrounding, on the 
basis of its guaranteed subjective rights . . . This means th a t  in such 
cases the  conventional rules are indirectly supported  by m eans o f enfor­
cem ent.”22 Since general in ternational law does not acknowledge the  
possibility of using force, not even in retaliation for the  violation of law, 
arm ed forces can be deployed only for defense purposes. Therefore “the 
revolt against every convention” cannot result in an  arm ed action o f the 
environm ent, b u t only th a t  who threatens the existence of the  conven­
tional order itself — th a t  is, the in ternational order — or the  existence 
of one of its members.
So far I  have only com pared the  in ternational legal san tion  with 
the dom estic legal sanction. However, the image appearing about the 
la tte r  one would not be complete, since in the  comparison I  always took 
the substantial features of dom estic law as a basis. So I  have to  add now 
some factors of non-svbstantial, secondary character of the implémentation 
of the domestic legal sa nctions. These will provide fu rther additional details 
to  understand why in ternational law cannot be judged on the  basis of 
requirem ents o f the domestic law.
The m ost im portan t of such factors is th a t  sanctions cannot be ap p ­
lied against every person com m itting an ac t against the  law in dom estic 
law either. Because in crim inal law for instance, th e  following factors 
have to  be ensured: 1. the com m itted ac t becomes known and learned 
abou t by the  au thorities as well; 2. the  person of the offender is known;
3. the  com m itted crim e is provable; 4. conditions excluding or e lim inat­
ing the  possibility of penalty  does not exist; 5. the  a tto rney  is ready to 
indict: 0. the  court comes to  the conclusion th a t  the  infliction of a sanc­
tion (penalty) would effectively serve the im provem ent of the  accused 
as well as the protection of the society. Clearly, it happens very rarely  
th a t  all the  conditions are ensured.
According to  the  estim ation of criminologists, about 30 to  GO per 
cent o f the crim inals are never impeached (the proportion is changing 
from  country to  country), due to the reasons m entioned in the  first two 
points. I t  is a well-known fact th a t  in certain countries im peachm ent can 
be postponed for years in  special cases, even it can be dropped, and seve­
ral crim inals escape punishm ent even if  their crime has been proved.
The s itua tion  is no t much more favourable in o ther branches of law 
either. Are all the  tenan ts  who fail to pay the ren t evicted ? — asks Fried 
in his article about the  efficiency o f international law. Can one member 
of the divorced couple be compelled to leave the  apartm en t if  the  court 
brought a sentence to  th is effect ? — we could also raise the  question in 
H ungary. Fried  notes th a t public opinion evaluates th e  violation of 
in ternational law not prim arily  on the basis of legal notions of civil or 
political law, b u t compare it  in most of the cases with crimes. For th is
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very reason — he adds — in ternational law should be “de-crim inalized” . 
Because one should not forget th a t international law constitutes one 
undifferentiated  en tity  in the  curren t phase of its developm ent, contrary 
to  dom estic law which is divided into several branches (criminal law, 
civil law, etc.)- The regulation m ethods o f the  la tte r ones are completely 
different, therefore the ir system  of sanctions is also varied. The principle 
of “every th ie f should be punished” is consequently not applied even by 
crimical law, not to  m ention the o ther branches of law.
In ternational law can be expected even to  a lesser ex ten t to follow 
th a t  principle strictly  in  every case. Punishm ent is only one of the means 
the society has a t  its disposal in the struggle waged against delinquency. 
Criminology — Fried sta tes — has always placed em phasis on the com­
plex system  o f social measures. In  o ther fields (e. g. violation of the law 
by a civil servant) the possible social reaction can range from a simple 
informal warning through formal disciplinary punishm ent to  criminal 
im peachm ent — depending on the  weight of the action com m itted23.
In  connection w ith dom estic law we have m entioned th a t its main fea­
tu re  is the  sub- and super-ordinated interrelationship  of people guiding 
others’ behaviour and those guided. Law, however, regulates o ther social 
relations, too, including the connections between those who guide and who 
are guided.
In  addition, every proper law system  ensures several rights and 
privileges against those guiding, th a t is, various bodies of central sta te  
power and s ta te  adm inistration. Would it be possible to  apply a sanction 
— let us say — in respect o f two leading s ta te  adm inistration bodies, if 
one of them  violated the norms regulating their contacts ? Can a sanction 
be applied against a leading body if  it  does not ensure in  effect the im ­
plem entation of the  righ t of people belonging to  its leadership ? Trying 
to  answer such questions, the constitutional lawyers either leave the 
actual developm ent of social-political relations ou t of account and give 
a formal reply, or say th a t  the activ ities of higher bodies generally are 
not covered by the  sphere of au tho rity , effectively regulable by law. 
The average reader of papers, on the other hand, recalls all the things he 
has read about such cases, about reshuffling the governm ents, resigna­
tion of m inisters. The only thing he cannot decide is always: who violated 
the law — the one who was dismissed, or the others who decided the 
dismissal. Because there is no judicial body which would be able to  pass a 
judgem ent. As there  is no such in stitu tion  either which would be able 
to  supervise th e  decisions brought in the  top  political sphere. Although 
Géza Marlon wrote in  th is context as early as in 1910 th a t  “every con­
stitu tion  contains in its parts on regulating the operation of the top bodies 
of sta te , such articles whose im plem entation through enforcement is 
im possible”.24 Regarding their content, such norms have more conven­
tional elements since th ey  in fact express a compromise — or w hat is 
the  same — the consensus of those being in  power. W hen these norms 
are violated, it is the political power-relations and not legal considera­
tions which finally decide the  m atter. But if  the debate emerging in th is
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way assumes a political character, th is will mean only th a t  the  conflict­
ing parties resort to  legal means, too, in the political struggle.
And all th is leads to  the conclusion th a t  the application of sanctions 
by dom estic law is not a sim ple au tom atic process as held by public 
th inking. Domestic law also has such elements, which — as far as their 
content goes — are very sim ilar to  international law and which, accord­
ing to  the  changes in political power-relations, are im plem ented with 
the to ta l negligence of the classical system  of legal sanctions.
My reply to  the  question raised in  the title  is th a t  sanctions — in the 
legal sense of the term  — are contained only occasionally by in ternational 
law; consequently it  does no t characterize th is legal system . The viola­
tion  of the law, on the  o ther hand, m ay have certain  social consequences, 
which, regarding their essence, mean the reduction or discontinuation 
of cooperation on the  p a rt of the  offended p a rty  in  political, econo­
mic, cultural and o ther fields of life. The im plem entation of in ternational 
law is guaranteed not by categories of contrain ts b u t by the  in terest 
the  parties have in cooperation.
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Общее понятие права необходимо включает в себя нормы принуждения, его 
неотъемлемая часть -  категория санкции. Подавляющее большинство юрнстов- 
международников сходится во мнении, что и для этой отрасли права главной ха­
рактеристикой является способ принуждения, с чем автор данной статьи не согласен.
В качестве довода указывается на то обстоятельство, что у с л о в и я  исполнения 
норм международного права н тождественны у с л о в и я м  внутреннего права. Во 
внутреннем праве всегда одни осуществляют правопорядок, д и к т у ю т  нормы пове­
дения другому, и даже наиболее демократично вынесенные решения не могут удов­
летворять интересы одновременно всех, участвующих в данном правоотношении, 
классов, групп, прослоек пли нндмвидумов. При таком положении исполнение 
норм может быть обеспечено лишь путём принудительных .мер, т.е. применения 
санкции. А в сфере международного права государства выступают одновременно 
и как правотворнтели и как носители данной правовой нормы: государства по общей 
договорённости определяют нормы своего поведения. Таким образом теоретически 
нет необходимости применения мер принуждения, поскольку эти нормы одинаково 
служат интересам всех сторон, участвующих в данном международном право­
отношении.
Но в международной практике существуют нередкие примеры, когда в резуль­
тате столкновения интересов возникает такое разногласие между государствами, 
которое ведет к нарушению одной из сторон принятой правовой нормы. В этом случае 
потерпевшая сторона может применить по отношению к государству-правонаруши- 
телыо меры воздействия (риторзня или репрессалия), иными словами она правомочна 
на применение санкции. При существующей международной структуре, однако, 
невозможно решить, имело ли право государство использован, по отношению к 
другому данное конкретное действие в качестве санкции, или не явилось ли само 
конкретное действие правонарушением. Здесь нет такого форума, который -  подобно 
существующему в системе внутреннего права -  смог бы во всех случаях с юриди­
ческой силой определить данное поведение государства. При таком положении про­
тивным сторонам не остается другого, как самим внеправовым образом приступить 
к разрешению конфликта. Но такое, используемое в качестве санкции, поведение 
государства в существующей системе международного права может быть квалифи­
цировано лишь как фактическое, а не правовое последствие правонарушения.
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Что касается содержания такого поведения госудаства то, согласно автору, оно 
тоже не имеет себе равного среди санкций внутреннего права. Применяемая госу­
дарством санкция довольно редко проявляется как принуждение в его тесном смысле 
слова, поскольку чаще всего она выражается фактором прекращения или приоста­
новления состояния сотрудничества.
Исхода из вышеизложенного, автор -  п о л ь з у я с ь  терминологией Вебера -  
называет международным правопорядком такой конвенциональный порядок, дейст­
венность которого обеспечивается вероятностью для государства, нарушившего 
такой порядок, обнаружить со стороны пострадавшего государства (государств) 
сокращение или прекращение ранее проявленной им (ими) готовности к сотрудни­
честву.
VERFÜGT DAS VÖLKERRECHT ÜRER SANKTIONEN?
Von
D R. L  ÄS ZLO VALKI  
U ni vers i ta  t sdozen t
( Z US A M M E N FASS U X G )
N ach der R echtstheorie g ib t es kein R echt ohne Sank tionen . Der Verfasser un tes 
such t in seiner Studie die Frage, ob diese These auch für das Völkerrecht gü ltig  ist. E r 
•stellt fest, daß  es falsch is t, die K ategorien des Völkerrechts a u f  G rund des Begriffsystem  
des s taa tlichen  R echts zu beurteilen. Im  staatlichen  R ech t regeln näm lich im m er einzelne 
die L ebensverhältn isse anderer und sogar die m eist dem okratischen E ntscheidungen lösen 
das E invers tändn is aller K lassen, Schichten und Einzelnen n ich t aus. U n ter solchen Ver­
hältn issen  kann die E inhaltung  des staa tlichen  R echts n u r du rch  Sanktionen erzwungen 
werden. Im  Völkerrecht is t aber der Kreis der Entscheidenden und der du rch  E n tschei­
dungen V erpflichteten derselbe. Die Sanktion is t prinzipiell unnöt ig, weil die E inhaltung  
der Entscheidungen im Interesse aller Teilnehm er liegt.
In  der P raxis is t die S ituation  natürlich  etwas anders. Die Interessengegensätze lösen 
R echtsverletzungen avis. Diese R echtsverletzungen w erden aber — im G egensatz zum 
staa tlichen  R echt -  fast nie au f  dem  Rechtsw eg beurteilt, infolgedessen kann  bei der 
Anwendung der Selbsthilfe niem and m it G ewißheit sagen, ob die Selbsthilfe eine rech ts­
m äßig angew andte R epressalie oder ein rechtsw idriger A kt war. Die K onflik te werden in 
der heutigen in ternationalen  S ituation  n ich t au f dem Rechtswege, sondern durch  d ip lo­
m atische V erhandlungen erledigt, wenn sie überhaup t erledigt werden. Die Sanktion ist 
im V erhältnis dazu nur de facto und n ich t de ju re  Folge der R echtsverletzung.
Als Schlußfolgerung be ton t der Verfasser, daß die in te rna tiona le  Sanktion  n ich t als 
Zwangsm aßnahm e au ftr itt, sondern als Aufhören oder V erm inderung der K ooperations­
bereitschaft der beleidigten Parte i erscheint.
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